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The paper assesses the welfare effects of biotechnological progress, as exemplified by 
tree improvements, using a partial equilibrium model. Timber demand is assumed to 
be stochastic and the distributions of the coefficients of the demand function are 
known. Assuming that timber supply is a log-linear function of timber price and forest 
inventory, we determine the coefficients of the supply function by maximizing the 
expected present value of the total surplus of timber production, both in the presence 
and in the absence of genetically improved regeneration materials. The supply 2 
 
functions are then used to estimate the expected present values of the total surplus in 
different cases through simulation. These estimates enable us to assess the direct 
effect and the total effect of the genetically improved regeneration materials on the 
expected present value of the total surplus. By taking the difference between these 
two effects, we obtain an estimate of the effect of changing harvest behavior induced 
by the use of genetically improved regeneration materials in forestry. The main results 
of the study are (1) the presence of genetically improved regeneration materials has 
significant impacts on the aggregate timber supply function; (2) application of 
genetically improved regeneration materials leads to a significant increase in the 
expected present value of the total surplus; (3) a considerable proportion of the 
welfare gain results from the change in timber harvest behavior; and (4) the use of 
genetically improved regeneration materials reduces the profits of timber production.   
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Biotechnological progress in forestry has been relatively fast in the sense that the 
productivity of forest land has increased considerably in the past decades. In Sweden, 
for example, the current timber growth is 30% above what was considered to be the 
maximum level in the 1930s. The increase in forest growth is partly attributed to the 3 
 
improved silvicultural practices in general, but the use of genetically better materials in 
stand establishment is certainly one of the most important constituting factors. 
 
Planting genetically improved trees is nowadays perceived as one of the most efficient 
methods to enhance timber yield and the income of forest owners (Simonsen et al. 
2007). Genetically improved trees can for example better resist damages, increase 
growth, and produces wood of higher quality. A higher survival rate of seedlings and 
higher production can in addition reduce the costs for stand establishment, 
management, and harvesting. In general, the cost of producing traditional 
seed-orchard seeds is very low compared to the great benefits, making the use of 
seed-orchard seedlings highly profitable and attractive to most forest owners. The 
logistics of seedling distribution from a small number of forest nurseries adds to the 
potential of widespread use of genetically improved trees. In Sweden, 80 % of all 
Scots pine and 50 % of all Norway spruce seedlings originate from seed orchard seeds. 
In fact, all available seed-orchard seeds are used and new seed orchards are being 
established to cover the whole Swedish nursery market (Rosvall et al. 2002). By using 
currently producing seed orchards and those which will be available in the future from 
already decided investments, the total timber harvest in Sweden is expected to 
increase by 9% in the future (Skogsstyrelsen 2009). Rosvall (2007) estimates that 




Research on economic valuation of new genetic materials in forestry started in the late 
1960s. One of the first papers is Davis (1967), which focuses on the cost of producing 
genetically improved seeds through investment in loblolly pine clonal seed-orchard 
and on the increase in timber yield necessary to make the investment profitable. A 
number of similar studies were conducted in the early 1970s
1. More recent empirical 
evaluations of different tree improvement programs include Fins and Moore (1984), 
Stier (1990), and Palmer et al. (1998). Löfgren (1985) investigates theoretically how 
different types of biotechnological progress affect optimal forest management and the 
economic value of forestry. Löfgren (1988, 1990, 1996) extend previous economic 
analyses of tree improvements by introducing a number of general results on the 
properties of the optimal value function, i.e., the economic value of the forest under 
best practice associated with different types of biotechnology. Specifically, these 
works show how the economic gains from genetic progress can be given upper and 
lower bounds that, to a considerable extent, can be calculated based on current 
management practices. 
 
In a general equilibrium setting, i.e., when imbedded in the rest of the economy, the 
analysis shows how the valuation problem (the cost-benefit analysis) can be solved in 
a market economy under different institutional regimes (Löfgren 1990). Here the 
impacts of consumer preferences are accounted for, as well as the effects of different 
sectors of the economy. The value generated by genetic progress, in the natural 
                                                        
1  See Dutrow (1974) for a review of the earlier studies. 5 
 
resource sector, emerges in terms of cost-benefit rules which tell us which component 
have to be estimated empirically. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous economic analyses by explicitly 
considering the impact of accelerated forest growth, resulting from the use of 
improved seeds, on timber price and on harvesting decisions. We will draw heavily on 
a methodology developed in Gong (1994,1995) and use a stochastic partial 
equilibrium model of the Swedish forest sector. This allows for contra factual 
comparisons of old and new regeneration materials that are introduced gradually in 
the forest sector. 
 
2.    A conceptual description of the welfare effects of tree improvement 
 
Tree improvement increases the productivity of forestland and, therefore, affects both 
forest owners and “timber consumers” (the timber processing industry and other users 
of timber). From the perspective of forest owners, access to genetically improved 
regeneration materials (IRMs) implies that forest stands established in the future will 
grow faster than the existing ones. This means that they will be able to produce a 
greater amount of timber in their forests, but timber prices are likely to be lower (than 
in the absence of the IRMs) in the future as a result of the increase in production. The 
financial consequences of tree improvement, for the forest owners, depend on the 
relative magnitudes of the increase in timber yield and the decrease in prices. 6 
 
However, advances in tree improvement will increase the consumer surplus, since the 
increase in the productivity of forestland implies that the timber processing industry 
and other users of timber can purchase greater amounts of timber at lower prices.   
 
When IRMs emerge, the anticipated changes in the productivity of forestland and in 
timber prices would probably lead to changes in silvicultural practices as well as 
changed rotation ages, both for existing stands and for stands to be established using 
the IRMs. This means that the relationship between timber supply and factors 
affecting the optimal harvest decisions may change. Under the assumption of rational 
behavior, forest owners will change their management decisions in order to increase 
their gains (or reduce their losses) resulting from the use of IRMs. Such changes in 
management behavior are likely to affect consumers negatively. However, if the 
market leads to a socially optimal allocation of the resources, the change in forest 
management behavior in response to the presence of IRMs would increase the social 
welfare.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in welfare at time t, when forest owners start to use 
IRMs at time 0. To keep the figure simple, we assume here that the timber demand 
and supply functions are both linear. Further, we pretend that the total surplus at time t 
is equal to the area between the demand curve and the supply curve
2. The supply 
curve S
b(I
b, p) depicts the relationship between the optimal harvest level and timber 
                                                        
2  This is incorrect in the context of multiple-period natural resource management problems.   7 
 
price at time t, in the absence of IRMs, where I
b denotes the (mature) timber stock in 
the forests at time t. The supply curve S
b(I
n, p) shows the amount of timber to be 
harvested at time t corresponding to different prices in the case where IRMs have 
been used, but there is no change in forest owners’ management behavior. Thus, the 
shift of the supply curve from S
b(I
b, p) to S
b(I
n, p) is caused solely by the change in the 
growing stock of timber from I
b to I
n. It does not involve any change in the supply 
function itself. Finally, the supply curve S
o(I
o, p) describes the relationship between 
the harvest and price at time t after the forest owners have changed their management 
behavior in response to the presence of IRMs. It gives the optimal harvest level 
corresponding to different prices at time t.  
 
Figure 1 shows that the adoption of IRMs results in an increase in the welfare at time t 
by an amount equal to the area ABEF. This change in welfare can be decomposed into 
two parts: the direct effect (indicated by area ABCD), and the effect of changing 
management behavior (indicated by the area DCEF). The direct effect tells how much 
the total surplus would change, as a result of the adoption of IRMs, if forest owners 
manage their forests as they used to do (except that they use the IRMs to regenerate 
the harvested sites). The effect of changing management behavior refers to the 
additional change in welfare when forest owners adapt their management activities to 
the new biological and economic conditions resulting from the use of IRMs.   
 
The magnitude of the effect of changing management behavior depends on the 8 
 
difference between the two supply curves S
b(I
n, p) and S
o(I
o, p). If the use of IRMs 
does not induce any change in the relationship between the optimal harvest level and 
the factors that determine the optimal harvest decision, the supply curve S
b(I
n, p) 
would be identical to S
o(I
o, p). Consequently, there would not be any effect from 
changing management behavior. On the other hand, if the supply function changes 
significantly when IRMs are used, the effect of changing management behavior on 
welfare could be large.   
 
It should be pointed out that the direct effect as well as the effect of changing 
management behavior is likely to vary with time. Thus, one cannot examine the 
welfare effects of tree improvement by examining the change in the total surplus (the 
sum of producer surplus, i.e. forest owners’ profits and consumer surplus) at a single 
point in time. Rather, one should examine the sum of properly discounted changes in 
total surplus at different points in time. Figure 1 describes a situation where both 
types of effects are positive. However, it is possible that the emergence of IRMs 
causes the total surplus to increase at some points in time, but decrease at others. 
Because of the complex interactions between optimal forest management decisions, 
timber supply, and the dynamics of the forests, numerical analyses are required to 
determine the sign and assess the magnitudes of the direct effect and the effect 








In order to assess the effect of changing management behavior on the welfare changes 
resulting from tree improvement, we need to know the “optimal” supply function both 
in the absence and in the presence of IRMs. We use the word “optimal” to emphasize 
that the supply function should describe the relationship between the optimal harvest 
level and its determining factors.   
 





















difficult, in particular if one bases the approach on relationships estimated using 
historical data. This insight was forcefully introduced in a paper by Robert Lucas in 
1976 where he showed how policy based on parameters that are not policy invariant, 
i.e. they change whenever the policy/experiment changes, could potentially be very 
misleading. An example would be a general equilibrium macroeconomic model where 
certain parameters, estimated from historical data, change whenever fiscal or 
monetary policy changes. This argument questioned the large scale econometric 
models that lacked foundations in dynamic economic theory. Lucas suggested that, if 
we want to conduct a counterfactual experiment, we should model the “deep” 
parameters relating to underlying preferences, technology and resource constraints.   
 
Our counterfactual experiment will use a slightly different approach based on an idea 
suggested by Gong (1994, 1995) to handle “the Lucas critique”. Here we model the 
shapes of the demand and supply functions that are determined by their respective 
parameters
3. The parameters of the stochastic demand function are calibrated from 
previous econometric estimates of its position and its elasticity, while the optimal total 
surplus is determined by optimizing with respect to the parameters of the supply 
function conditional on the demand function. The underlying resource constraints 
pertain to the state of the forest, its age structure and its growth function. Our 
experiment is to compare the impact on the optimal value function (total surplus) 
a s s o c i a t e d   w i t h   d i f f e r e n t   g r o w t h   f u n c t i o n s .                               
                                                        
3  This can be made in a very general manner by introducing parameters related to a Taylor expansion, 
but here we restrict the optimal controls/parameters to three.   11 
 
  
In other words, we determine the theoretically optimal timber supply function both in 
the absence and in the presence of the new and better regeneration materials. These 
supply functions are then used to estimate the direct effect and the effect of changing 
management behavior on the total surplus following the introduction of new and 
better regeneration materials. 
 
3.1 Overview of the method 
 
Conceptually, the timber supply function gives the optimal amount of timber harvest 
in each time period conditional on the current state of the forest and market conditions. 
This means that one can, in principle, identify the timber supply function based on the 
characteristics of the optimal harvest decisions. When considering a particular forest, 
the optimal harvest decision maximizes the value of a properly defined objective 
function that represents the preferences of the forest owner. Accordingly, the timber 
supply function at the first-property level could be determined by maximizing the 
forest owner’s objective function (Gong 1994, 1995). In a perfectly competitive 
market, the time path of the aggregate supply of timber (the sum of optimal harvests 
from all forests in each time period) is characterized by maximization of the present 
value of the total surplus (Lyon and Sedjo 1983, Gong and Löfgren, 2003). Therefore, 
we can determine the market supply function by maximizing the present value of the 
total surplus. 12 
 
 
In this paper, we consider the case when the timber demand function is stochastic. We 
assume that all forest owners are risk neutral, and determine the market supply 
function by maximizing the EPV of the total surplus over time. Specially, we choose a 
functional form of the timber supply function (,; ) tt SX p A and determine the 
parameters() A of the supply function by solving the following maximization problem: 
  0
1
















QS X p A


             ( 2 )  
1 (,) tt t XG X Q                   ( 3 )  
10 XX                    ( 4 )  
where E is the expectation operator, 
(;) tt P QB= the inverse timber demand function at time t. The functional form of 
(;) tt P QBas well as the probability distributions of the random parameters ( t B ) are 
assumed to be known.   
(,) tt CX Q = forest management and harvest costs as a function of the state of the 
forest and the harvest level. 
t Q = the market supply of (and demand for) timber at time t.  
t p = the market price of timber at time t.  
t X = the state of the forest at time t.  
0 X = the initial state of the forest.   
r = discount rate 13 
 
(,) tt GX Q   = the growth function of the forest. 
 
Constraint (2) is the market clearing condition. Constraint (3) is the dynamics of the 
forests. Equation (4) gives the initial state of the forests. Of course, the total harvest at 
each point in time cannot exceed the total growing stock of timber in the forests. This 
constraint is embedded in the supply function.   
 
Except in some trivial cases, it is impossible to derive a closed form expression of the 
EPV of the total surplus given in Equation (1). Solution of the above optimization 
problem will have to rely on numerical approximations of the objective function. In 
the current case, stochastic variations in the total surplus originate from uncertainty in 
the coefficients of the timber demand function. Given a timber supply function, a 
simple way to estimate the EPV of the total surplus is to take the average of the 
present values of the total surplus associated with a large number of randomly drawn 
timber demand scenarios.   
 
Let  12 , ,...,
kk k
T BB B   denote the coefficients of the demand function in years 1 to T in 
scenario  k, where
k
t B is a random sample drawn from the distribution of t B . A 
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
,   for  t = 1…T; k = 1…N          ( 6 )  
1 (,)
kk k
tt t XG X Q   ,  for  t = 1…T; k = 1…N          ( 7 )  
10
k XX  ,     for  k = 1…N              ( 8 )  
where N is the number of demand scenarios used to estimate the EPV of the total 
surplus; T is the time horizon within which the annual harvest of timber is determined 
using the supply function; 
k
t Q is the market supply (and demand) of timber in year t 
in scenario k; 
k
t p is the market price of timber in year t in scenario k; 
k
t X is the state 
of the forest in year t in scenario k; and 1 ()
k
T RX is the value of the forest in year T+1. 
To be specific, the term 1 ()
k
T RX represents the sum of the discounted total surplus the 
forest will generate from year T+1 and onwards. That is: 
  1 0
1
() ( ; ) ( , )
t Q kr t
Tt t t
tT







            
By constructing a special rule of determining the harvest volumes t Q for t = T+1 to 
infinity we will be able to estimate the value of the forest at time T+1. This is needed 
for estimating the EPV of the total surplus associated with a given timber supply 
function.  
 
The optimization model (5)-(8) can be used to determine the coefficients of the timber 
supply function both in the absence and in the presence of IRMs. In terms of the 
optimization model, the two cases differ from each other only in the growth function 
of the forests. Let (,)
b
tt GXQand  (,)
n
tt GXQdenote the growth functions of the 
forests in the absence and in the presence of the IRMs, respectively. Then, by solving 15 
 
the optimization model (5)-(8) using the growth function (,)
b
tt GXQwe obtain the 
coefficients of the timber supply function and the EPV of the total surplus in the 
absence of IRMs. Denote this optimal solution by
b A and [ ( )]
bb ET S A . Similarly, if the 
growth function ( , ) tt GX Q in Equation (7) is replaced by (,)
n
tt GXQ, then the optimal 
solution of problem (5)-(8) gives us the coefficients of the timber supply function and 
the EPV of the total surplus in the presence of IRMs. Denote this optimal solution by
n A and [ ( )]
nn ET S A . 
 
Relating to Figure 1, the EPV of the total surplus in the absence of IRMs, [ ( )]
bb ET S A , 
corresponds to the area AOB. The EPV of the total surplus in the presence of IRMs,
[( ) ]
nn ET S A , corresponds to the area FOE. The difference between  [ ( )]
nn ET S A  and 
[( ) ]
bb ET S A   is, hence, the total welfare effect of using the IRMs.   
 
We can decompose the total welfare effect into the direct effect and the effect of 
changing harvest behavior by estimating the EPV of the total surplus in the following 
situation: IRMs are used in forest regeneration, but the forest owners do not change 
their harvest behavior. The use of IRMs means that the dynamics of the forests should 
be described by the growth function (,)
n
tt GXQ. Since the forest owners do not 
change their harvest behavior，the timber supply function remains as  (,;)
b
tt SX p A . 
The EPV of the total surplus in this case, denoted by [ ( )]
nb ET S A , is estimated using 
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QS X p A


, for t= 1…T;   k = 1 … N           ( 1 0 )  
1 (,)
kn k k
tt t XG X Q     for  t= 1…T; k=1…N          ( 1 1 )  
10
k XX       for  k=1…N             ( 1 2 )  
The EPV of total surplus  [ ( )]
nb ET S A   corresponds to the area DOC in Figure 1. 
 
The direct effect of using IRMs on welfare is: 
[ ( )] [ ( )]
nb bb ET S A ET S A   
The effect of changing harvest behavior is: 
[( ) ][( ) ]
nn nb ET S A ET S A   
This term measures the result of an attempt to avoid the “Lucas critique”.     
 
3.2 Specification of the model 
 
This section describes in detail the specific version of model (5)-(8) we used in our 
numerical assessment of the effect of using IRMs. To make the presentation easier and 
less messy, we skip the demand scenario index k in all variables and parameters. 
Superscripts are still used, but for other purposes.   
 
3.2.1 The state of the forests   
 17 
 
The forestland is divided into two parts, productive land and less productive land. In 
each part, there can be two types of stands - the initially existing stands (old stands) 
and stands which will be established using IRMs after the old stands have been 
harvested. The new stands are expected to grow faster and provide larger timber 
yields than the old stands on similar land, and hence should be separated from the old 
ones in the model. The state of the forest in each time period is described by the 
age-distribution of each of the four types of stands (old stands on productive land, old 
stands on less productive land, new stands on productive land, and new stands on less 
productive land). For simplicity we call each type of stand a forest. The state of the 
i-th forest is denoted by   
,1 ,2 , ( , ,..., )
ii i i
tt t t M Xx x x  ,    
where  ,
i
ta x (i =1…4; t = 1…T; a = 1…M) is the total area of a-year old stands in forest 
i in time period t, T is the simulation time horizon, and M is the maximum age of the 
stands.  
 
Table 1. The four forests included in the model. 
Identification number  Description of the forest 
i = 1  old stands on less productive land 
i = 2  old stands on productive land 
i = 3  new stands on less productive land 
i = 4  new stands on productive land 
 18 
 
The age-distributions enable us to describe and simulate the dynamics of the forests 
more precisely than highly aggregate forest state variables (such as the timber 
inventory). However, it is neither practical nor desirable to include directly the 
age-distributions as arguments of the supply function. In the supply function, the state 
of the forests in each time period t was described by one aggregate state variable, the 
inventory of mature timber stock. Let ( )
i Va be the per unit area timber stock of the 
a-year old stands in forest i. Given the age-distributions of the forests in period t, the 











 ,               ( 1 3 )  
where m is the lowest stand age at which harvest of the stand is allowed. 
 
3.2.2 Demand and supply functions 
 
The inverse demand function in time period t is 
2 1 (,) ()
t
tt tt PQ B Q





t  are stochastic coefficients. We assume that
1
t  as well as
2
t  for t = 
1…T are independent and identically distributed normal variables. Furthermore, in 




t   are  independent.  
 
The supply function is modeled as: 
3 12 (, ;) ()( ) tt t t SI p A e I p
   ,             ( 1 5 )  





Substitute the demand function (14) and the supply function (15) into Equation (6), 














,  for  t = 1…T          ( 1 6 )  
 
3.2.3 The harvest areas in different stands 
 
The set of equations (16) enable us to determine the total harvest volume and timber 
price in each time period corresponding to each state of the forests. In order to 
determine the management and harvest costs, as well as the age-distributions of the 
forests in the next time period, we need to decide which forest stands should be 
harvested to obtain the market clearing amount of timber. The decision on the stands 
to be harvested in each period is made based on estimates of the expected gain of 
delaying the harvest by one year. The expected gain from delaying the harvest of an 
a-year old stand in forest i is defined as:   
  [( ) ] ( )( 1 ) ( )( )
ii i r i i
th th E ga p CVa Le p CVa L
             ( 1 7 )  
where pt is the timber price in period t,  h C is the per cubic meter timber harvest cost, 
and L
i is the expected value of bare land in forest i, which is determined using the 
                                                        
4 Defining the constant term in the supply function as the base e raised to the power of 1  helps to 
improve the precision of the numerical solution.   20 
 
long-run steady state expected timber price
5. In each period t, stands were selected for 
harvesting in the order of increasing expected gain from delaying the harvest. That is, 
one starts by harvesting the stands that have the lowest expected gain from delaying 
the harvest, then continue to harvest the stands that have the second lowest expected 
gain and so on until a specific amount of timber has been obtained. This rule of 
selecting the stands to harvest is, in principle, the same as the rule of harvesting in the 




ta h (i =1…4; t = 1…T; a = m…M) denote the area of the a-year old stands in 




ta h   then ,,
jj
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ji Eg b Eg a     (18a) 
where ()
i g    is the expected gain function. The harvest areas in different stands should 











  ,               ( 1 8 b )  
,,
ii
ta ta hx  ,  i =1…4, a = m…M,             ( 1 8 c )  
Equation (18b) means that the total amount of timber harvested from the forests 
should equal the amount delivered to the market. (18c) says that the harvest area in 
each stand cannot exceed the total area of the stand. The three conditions (18a)-(18c) 
enable us to determine the area to be harvested in each stand conditional on the state 
of the forests and the total amount of timber to be harvested.   
                                                        
5  The expected timber price associated with the long-run steady state of the forests.   21 
 
 
We assume that the harvested area is regenerated immediately, but ignore all other 
management activities. Thus the state of the forests in each time period has no direct 
effect on the management and harvest costs
6. The total harvest area in forest i in 








 ,   i  = 1 … 4 .               
 
3.2.4 Harvest and regeneration costs 
  
The total regeneration area in each of the forests depends on whether IRMs are 
available. In the absence of IRMs, the area of the “new forests” is always zero and the 
harvested area in each of the “old forests” remains in the same “old forest”. The total 
regeneration area in each forest in period t is:  













              ( 1 9 a )  
In the presence of IRMs, we assume that all harvested areas will be regenerated with 
the new materials
7. This means that, after regeneration, the harvested area in each of 
the “old forests” moves to the corresponding “new forest”. The total regeneration area 
in each forest in period t would be:   
                                                        
6  The state of the forests affects the management and harvest costs indirectly through its impact on the 
total harvest volume and on the harvest area in each forest.   
7 It is more likely that only part of the harvested area in each forest will be regenerated with the new 
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Given the total regeneration area in each forest, the management and harvest costs in 





tt h t r t
i
CX Q C Q C R A

             ( 2 0 )  
where 
i
r C   is the per ha regeneration cost of forest i.  
 
3.2.5 Forest growth 
 
Forest growth was modeled by tracing the changes in the age-distributions of the 
forests over time. For each forest i (i = 1…4) and time period t (for t = 1…T): 
1 , , , ,1 ,1
ii i i i
t M tM tM tM tM xx h xh     ,            ( 2 1 a )  
1 , ,1 ,1
ii i
ta t a t a xxh   , for a = m+1…M- 1 ,           ( 2 1 b )  
1, , 1
ii
ta t a x x   ， for  a = 2… m,             ( 2 1 c )  
1,1
ii
tt x RA   ，                 ( 2 1 d )  
The regeneration areas
i
t RA are determined by equations (19a) or (19b), depending on 
whether IRMs are available.   
 
3.2.6 The end value 
 
In order to estimate the value of the forests remaining at the end of the simulation 
time horizon, we assumed that these forests will be converted to the long-run “optimal 23 
 
steady state” by keeping the periodic harvest area in each forest at a constant level. 
The long-run optimal steady state is defined conditional on the assumption that the 
forests will be managed according to the Faustmann rule. It is determined using the 
following conditions: 
(a) The total area of each forest is equally distributed among stands in 
different ages from 1 to the optimal rotation age. 
(b) Only the stands that have reached the optimal rotation age are harvested 
and regenerated in each period.   
By keeping the harvest area in each forest at a constant level, the forests remaining at 
the end of time period T will be converted to the optimal steady state after one 
rotation. During the transition period, the expected consumer and producer surplus in 
each year are implicitly determined by the age-distributions of each forest. Thereafter 




The total forest area covered in the analysis is 20 million ha (which includes all the 
productive forests in Sweden under the age of 120 years), divided into two soil 
productivity classes of approximately equal size (see Table 2). All the existing forests 
are classified as “old forests”. The current age-class distributions of these forests are 
determined based on data from national forest inventory (Figure 2). In the numerical 
analysis, each time period consists of one year. When determining the initial state of 24 
 
the forests, we assume that the forest stands within each age-class are uniformly 
distributed among different ages within that age-class.   
  
The “new forests” in Table 2 refer to those that will be established using IRMs. It is 
assumed that the forests established using IRMs grow 40% faster (measured in terms 
of the maximum mean annual increment, MAI) than the existing ones with the same 
site productivity.   
 
Table 2. Total area and productivity of the forest land and regeneration costs. 
  Old forests  New forests 
Site  productivity Low High Low High 
MAI  (m3/ha/yr) 3.5 5.5 4.9 7.7 
MAI max age (yrs)  120  100  110  90 
Regeneration cost 
(SEK/ha) 
6500 8500 6600 8600 




Figure 2. The age-class distribution of the existing forests. 
 
Timber yields (m
3/ha) in different stands were estimated using a modified version of 
the production function of Fridh and Nilsson (1980).   
/ 2.8967 0.02 ( ) * *1.6416*(1 6.3582 ) (1 )
i ii i a A a Va AY e
         ( 2 9 )  
where Y
i is the maximum MAI, and A
i is the stand age at which the MAI reaches its 
maximum (see Table 2). The term within the last pair of parentheses of yield function 
(29) is an age-dependent conversion factor. This is used to calculate the equivalent 
volume of timber of some standard grade corresponding to the growing timber stocks 
at different ages. The purpose of measuring timber yields in a standardized volume is 
to avoid the need for explicitly dealing with the dependence the yields of timber, of 
different grades, have on stand age and the dependence of the price on the grade of 
timber. 
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and the lowest harvest age was 60 years.   
 
The mean values and standard deviations of the inverse timber demand function used 
in this study are presented in Table 3. Based on the results of earlier empirical studies 
(Brännlund et.al. 1983, Brännlund 1988), we assume that the average price elasticity 
of timber demand is -0.6, which gives us the mean value of β
2. The mean value of β
1 
was determined based on the mean value of β
2 and the annual total supply and price in 
recent years. The standard deviations of the two parameters were set to 10 % of their 
mean values.   
 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of the demand function coefficients. 
Coefficient Mean  Standard  deviation 
β
1 473610.0 47361.0 
β
2 -1.67  0.167 
 
The harvest cost is 95 SEK/m
3, and a real interest rate of 3% was used throughout the 
analysis. The simulation time horizon was set to 200 years (T = 200). 100 randomly 
generated demand scenarios were used in the optimization of the supply function 
coefficients (N = 100).   
 
3.4 Solution methods 
 27 
 
The optimization problem (5)-(8) was solved as an unconstrained minimization 
problem – we solved the problem by finding the values of the supply function 
coefficients  A that minimize the negative of the EPV of total surplus, and the 
constraints (6)-(8) were used to determine the value of the objective function. Figure 3 
describes the procedure for estimating the EPV of the total surplus associated with 
different values of the coefficients of the supply function. The solution method we 
used was a combination of gradient descent and Powell’s method (Powell, 1964). 
Given an initial guess of the values of A, we used the gradient decent method to find 
an optimal solution with low precision, from where we continued the search for the 
optimal solution using Powell’s method.   
 
When optimizing the values of the supply function coefficients, the EPV of total 
surplus was estimated using 100 demand scenarios, both in the absence and in the 
presence of IRMs. After the optimal values of the supply function coefficients have 
been determined for the respective cases, extended simulations using different sets of 
demand scenarios were carried out to estimate the EPV of the total surplus in different 
situations. Optimizations of the supply function coefficients as well as the simulations 





                                                        
8  The program is available from the authors upon request. 28 
 
4.1 Timber supply function 
 
It is well known that a nonlinear optimization problem may have multiple local 
optimal solutions. In an attempt to find the global optimal solution, we solved the 
optimization problem repeatedly using different starting points, both for the 
benchmark case and the case when IRMs are used in forest regeneration. The starting 
points were generated randomly within some specified intervals (the initial values of 
α1 and α3 were chosen from the interval [0.6, 0.7], and the initial value of α2 was 
chosen from the interval [0.06, 0.16]).   
 
Table 4 presents 10 optimal solutions in the benchmark case (when IRMs are not 
available), in the order of a decreasing objective function value. These solutions were 
obtained using the same set of timber demand scenarios. This makes the objective 
function values associated with the different solutions directly comparable. To be 
more certain about the relative performances of the different supply functions, we 
estimated the EPV of the total surplus associated with each of the supply functions in 
Table 4 using 10 different sets of timber demand scenarios, where each set consists of 
1000 scenarios. The results for the first two supply functions are presented in Table 5. 
The last column in Table 5 shows the difference in the EPV of the total surplus 
between the first and the second solution presented in Table 4. The results in Table 5 
show clearly that the first solution is superior to the second one
9. The simulations 
                                                        
9 A simple t-test would show that the difference in the EPV between the two solutions is statistically 29 
 
showed that the first solution led to significantly larger EPV than each of the other 9 
solutions. Therefore, we chose the first solution in Table 4 as the global optimum for 
the benchmark case. That is, the optimal market supply function in the absence of 
IRMs is: 
19.759881 1.975686 1.720915 (,) () ()
b
tt t t SQp e Q p
                  ( 3 0 )  
Table 4. Optimal values of the supply function coefficients and the expected present 
value of the total surplus (billion SEK) in the absence of regeneration materials.     
Solution nr  α1  α2  α3 E[TS
b(α
b)] 
1 -19.759881  1.975686  1.720915  22475.4805 
2 -0.733306  0.091132  0.774019  22438.4648 
3 0.214024  0.100281  0.602536  22432.5384 
4 0.394788  0.041671  0.643698  22431.2745 
5 0.399262  0.052216  0.629837  22431.2237 
6 0.589985  0.043376  0.608511  22429.8152 
7 0.613215  0.009356  0.648415  22429.7295 
8 0.616827  0.065843  0.575978  22429.4367 
9 0.652272  0.039568  0.602555  22429.3543 
10 0.677073  0.048903  0.586619  22429.0750 
 
Table 5. Estimates of the expected present values of total surplus (billion SEK) 
associated with the first two solutions presented in Table 4. Each estimate is the 
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average of 1000 random samples.   
Simulation Nr  Solution Nr 1  Solution Nr 2  Difference 
1 22440.3458  22403.50  36.8456 
2 22483.4690  22446.63  36.8342 
3 22480.0278  22442.80  37.2307 
4 22491.9954  22454.33  37.6694 
5 22480.3823  22443.20  37.1823 
6 22486.3847  22449.45  36.9347 
7 22446.8810  22409.81  37.0710 
8 22490.5597  22453.59  36.9697 
9 22471.9369  22435.02  36.9169 
10 22483.7921  22446.44  37.3521 
Average 22475.5775 22438.48  37.1007 
 
Following the same procedure, we obtained the optimal supply function in the 
presence of IRMs: 
27.798934 2.497689 2.511081 (,) () ()
n
tt t t SQp e Q p
                  ( 3 1 )  
 
What may appear remarkable about the supply functions is that the inventory 
elasticity and the price elasticity are abnormally high. It should be emphasized that 
most of the solutions we obtained do have “normal” inventory and price elasticity (see 
Table 4 for the benchmark case). Yet, these solutions lead to a lower EPV of the total 31 
 
surplus, which implies that these supply functions do not provide better descriptions 
of the relationship between timber supply and the explanatory variables.   
 
The inventory elasticity of timber supply depends partly on the definition of inventory 
and the assumption about the area of forestland. For example, a change in the mature 
timber stock would have a larger impact on supply than a change in the total timber 
inventory in the forest. One can also imagine that the effect of increasing timber stock 
caused by an increase in the share of older stands in a forest would be larger than 
when the timber stock increase is caused by an expansion of the forest area. Likewise, 
the price elasticity of timber supply may depend on the age-class distribution of the 
forests. In this study, we used the mature timber stock (timber inventory in stands 
which are older than 60 years) as an independent variable in the supply function. The 
total area of forestland was fixed, which, together with the ranking rule used to select 
the stands to harvest, imply that the mature timber stock changes only through the 
change in the area of the oldest stands in the forests. The initial mature timber stock is 
over 2 000 million m
3, which is about 20 times larger than the annual harvest volume. 
With this background, it is not surprising that the inventory elasticity of supply is very 
high. The existence of this enormous mature timber stock is also the reason why the 
price elasticity of timber supply is high. When there is a large amount of timber in old 
stands, a small increase in timber price would cause a considerable change in the 
harvest volume.   
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4.2 Welfare effects 
 
In order to obtain reliable estimates of the welfare effects of using IRMs, we 
repeatedly estimated the EPV of the total surplus in each of the three cases (the 
benchmark case, the case with the new forest growth function and the benchmark 
supply function, and the case with the new growth function and new supply function). 
We used 20 different sets of demand scenarios, where each set consists of 1000 
demand scenarios.   
 
Table 6 presents the EPVs of producer surplus (forest management profits), consumer 
surplus, and the total surplus in the benchmark case. The huge EPVs of consumer 
surplus and total surplus are mainly the results of the iso-elastic demand function. One 
should keep in mind that it is the changes in the consumer surplus and in the total 
surplus that are important. The absolute values of the consumer surplus and the total 
surplus are not directly relevant.   
 
Table 6. The expected present values of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and total 
surplus in the absence of IRMs (unit: billion SEK). 
Simulation  Nr  producer surplus  consumer surplus total surplus 
1 623.73  21816.61  22440.35 
2 626.51  21856.96  22483.45 
3 627.85  21852.18  22480.03 33 
 
4 628.72  21863.28  22492.00 
5 626.43  21853.95  22480.38 
6 626.57  21859.81  22486.38 
7 624.24  21822.65  22446.88 
8 627.12  21863.44  22490.56 
9 625.81  21846.13  22471.94 
10 627.31  21856.48  22483.79 
11 629.26  21883.17  22512.43 
12 623.78  21818.19  22441.97 
13 627.61  21850.39  22478.00 
14 627.60  21859.93  22487.54 
15 631.29  21890.95  22522.24 
16 624.20  21823.23  22447.43 
17 626.57  21845.96  22472.53 
18 627.15  21851.37  22478.52 
19 629.64  21884.78  22514.42 
20 624.79  21825.45  22450.24 
Mean 626.81 21851.25  22478.06 
 
The EPV of forest management profits also appears to be very large. The actual profit 
from timber production in Sweden during 1987-2006 was, on average, 11.85 billion 34 
 
SEK per year (see Table 7). If we assume that the profit will remain at this level in the 
future, then with an interest rate of 3% the present value of all future profits would be 
395 billion SEK, which is about 60% of the EPV shown in Table 6. In our analysis, 
we included timber harvest and regeneration costs, but not the costs of e.g. forest road 
construction and maintenance, drainage, pre-commercial thinning etc. The costs that 
were neglected in our analysis are about 1.5 billion SEK per year. The present value 
of these costs is in the order of 50 billion SEK. Another simplification, which leads to 
overestimation of the EPV of future profits, is that we ignore thinning in our analysis.   
A considerable portion of the existing forests have been thinned before. The 
assumption of a thinning-free management regime led to an overestimation of the 
mature timber stock in the existing forests by about 800 million m
3. Very roughly, this 
means that the EPV of forest owners’ profits was overestimated by 100 billion SEK
10. 
After these two biases are deducted, our estimate of the EPV of forest owners’ profits 
reduces to 476 billion SEK, which is 20% higher than the value estimated based on 
the actual profits.   
 
When determining the aggregate timber supply function, we assumed that the timber 
market is perfectly competitive and ignored the impact of timber harvest on the 
non-timber benefits of the forests. Most forest owners in Sweden have multiple 
objectives and do not maximize solely the profits from timber production (Carlen 
1990, Andersson and Gong 2009). Moreover, the timber market in Sweden is not fully 
                                                        
10  Using the first year timber price net of harvest cost as a rough approximation of the marginal value 
of mature timber stock. 35 
 
competitive on the demand side, which further reduces the profits of timber 
production (Brännlund et al. 1983, Brännlund 1988). The EPV of the forest owners’ 
profits associated with the optimal supply function ought to be higher than the actual 
profits. There is no precise estimate of the potential increase in the timber production 
profits in Sweden that can be used to verify our results. However, it is not unrealistic 
that the present value of future profits can increase by 20% if the timber market is 
perfectly competitive, and the forest owners manage their forests to maximize the 
profits from timber production.   
 
The biases should not have any significant impact on the estimated effect of IRMs on 
the EPV of forest owners’ profits, as the other management costs and thinning were 
ignored in both the absence and presence of IRMs.   
 
Table 7. Annual revenues, costs and profits of timber production in Sweden during 
1987-2006 (billion SEK at 2006 price level). Source: Statistical Yearbook of Forestry. 
 Mean  Min  Max  std 
Gross  revenue  23.47 18.75 28.76  2.66 
Harvest  cost  8.79  6.66 13.40 1.85 
Regeneration  cost  1.36 0.96 2.13 0.37 
Other costs
a  1.47 0.97 2.17 0.38 
Profit    11.85 8.81 16.86 1.91 
a Include construction and maintenance of forest roads, drainage, pre-commercial thinning etc. 36 
 
 
Table 8 presents the EPV of the total surplus associated with different supply 
functions, in the presence of IRMs. Column C1 gives the estimates of the EPV of the 
total surplus when IRMs are used but the forest owners do not change their harvest 
behavior. The figures in Column C2 are the differences between the EPV estimates in 
column C1 and the corresponding estimates in the benchmark case (shown in the last 
column of Table 6), i.e. the direct effect on welfare of IRMs. Column C3 presents the 
estimates of the EPV of the total surplus when IRMs are used and the forest owners 
change their harvest behavior accordingly. The resulting changes in the EPV of the 
total surplus (column C4) are, therefore, estimates of the total welfare effect of IRMs. 
The last column of Table 8 shows the effect of changing harvest behavior. 
 
From Table 8, we see that the direct effect of using IRMs on the EPV of the total 
surplus is 27.41 billion SEK, and the total effect is 33.61 billion SEK. Accordingly, 
the effect of changing harvest behavior is 6.2 billion SEK, or about 18% of the total 
effect. 
 
Table 9 summarizes the effects of IRMs on the EPVs of forest owners’ profits and 
consumer surplus. The results show that access to IRMs causes the profits of timber 
production to decrease and the consumer surplus to increase. Once IRMs become 
available, they will be applied on large scales. This is simply the result of the force of 
competitive markets. As long as no single forest owner can influence the price of 37 
 
timber, it is better for the forest owner to use IRMs irrespective of whether the other 
forest owners use them or not. Widespread application of IRMs would cause timber 
supply to increase and timber price to decrease. If the price elasticity of timber 
demand is sufficiently large, the price effect would overweigh the effect of increasing 
the harvest on the forest owners’ profits.   
 
In a competitive market, forest owners behave as price takers. From the point of view 
of an individual forest owner, using the IRM would increase future timber yield but 
would not affect the evolvement of timber prices. In other words, for each forest 
owner, the access to IRMs implies that the value of forest land and, hence the 
opportunity cost of keeping the existing stands growing, increases. Therefore, the 
presence of IRMs would cause a forest owner to harvest the existing stands at lower 
ages. Simulations using the benchmark supply function do not capture this response 
by the forest owners, and therefore do not provide us with an estimate of the full 
welfare effect of IRMs. 
 
Figure 4 presents the expected annual supply of timber both in the absence and in the 
presence of IRMs, over a time period of 200 years. Figure 5 presents the expected 
timber prices corresponding to the time paths of supply presented in Figure 4. These 
two figures are helpful in understanding the difference between the direct effect and 
the total effect of using IRMs on the EPV of the total surplus. When simulated using 
the benchmark supply function, the presence of IRMs has no effect on the expected 38 
 
timber supply and the price during the first 60 years, and causes the timber supply to 
increase and the price to decrease thereafter. The reason is that, without considering 
the change in harvest behavior, IRMs would affect the supply and the price only 
through the impact on the mature timber stock. The mature timber stock is not 
affected by the use of IRMs before the first stands regenerated using the IRMs have 
reached a mature age. Simulation results using the optimal supply function, in which 
the change in the harvest behavior is embedded, show that the timber supply would 
increase and the price decrease immediately after IRMs become available. As a result, 
the mature timber stock in the initially existing forests is depleted at a faster rate in the 
presence of IRMs, which has a negative effect on future supply. As time passes, the 
effect on timber supply of the decrease in the mature timber stock becomes greater 
and would eventually outweigh the positive effect of the change in harvest behavior. 
When the stands regenerated using the IRMs have reached a mature age, the mature 
timber stock starts to increase and so does the aggregate supply of timber.   
 
Table 8. The expected present values of the total surplus in the presence of IRMs, 







Effect of changing 
harvest behavior   
ETS  change  ETS  change   
  C1 C2 C3 C4  C4-C2 
1 22467.78  27.43  22473.94  33.60  6.17 39 
 
2 22510.82  27.35  22516.96  33.49  6.14 
3 22507.44  27.41  22513.60  33.57  6.16 
4 22519.50  27.50  22525.74  33.74  6.24 
5 22507.70  27.32  22513.86  33.48  6.16 
6 22513.92  27.53  22520.05  33.66  6.13 
7 22474.24  27.36  22480.48  33.60  6.24 
8 22517.91  27.35  22524.08  33.52  6.17 
9 22499.25  27.31  22505.40  33.46  6.15 
10 22511.14  27.35  22517.39  33.60  6.24 
11 22539.87  27.44  22546.10  33.67  6.23 
12 22469.40  27.43  22475.56  33.59  6.16 
13 22505.44  27.43  22511.69  33.69  6.26 
14 22514.89  27.35  22521.14  33.60  6.25 
15 22549.66  27.42  22555.89  33.65  6.23 
16 22474.79  27.36  22481.03  33.60  6.24 
17 22499.92  27.40  22506.18  33.65  6.25 
18 22506.01  27.49  22512.25  33.73  6.24 
19 22541.88  27.46  22548.13  33.71  6.25 
20 22477.69  27.45  22483.85  33.61  6.16 
Average 22505.46  27.41  22511.67  33.61  6.20 
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Table 9. The expected present values of producer surplus and consumer surplus in the 
presence of IRMs (unit: billion SEK). 
 Producer  surplus change




596.72 -30.10  21908.75 57.50 
Optimal supply 
function 
583.35 -43.45  21928.31 77.06 
a Compared with the case where IRMs are not available.   
 
 





































Figure 5. Expected timber price in the absence and in the presence of IRMs. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
The main results of the study are (1) the presence of IRMs has significant impacts on 
the aggregate timber supply function; (2) the use of IRMs leads to a significant 
increase in the EPV of the total surplus; (3) a considerable proportion of the welfare 
gain from the use of IRMs results from the change in management behavior; and (4) 
the use of IRMs reduces forest owners’ profits from timber production.   
 
If IRMs are available, they will be applied on large scales even though forest owners’ 
profits may decrease. This is simply the result of the force of competitive markets. As 




































for each forest owner to use the new materials irrespective of whether other forest 
owners use them or not. On the other hand, we cannot conclude from the results of 
this study that forest owners’ profits will decrease as a result of the emergence of 
IRMs. Firstly, the effect of large scale application of IRMs on forest owners’ profits 
depends on the price elasticity of timber demand. If timber demand is perfectly elastic, 
for example, then the use of IRMs will increase the output without affecting the price 
and will thus increase the profits. Secondly, because not all forest owners are risk 
neutral, uncertainty in the growth effect of new regeneration materials would certainly 
slow down the speed of forest regeneration using IRMs. Thirdly, the emergence of 
IRMs might stimulate the demand for timber/biomass, which would affect forest 
owners’ profits positively.   
 
The results reported in this paper depend on the numerical assumptions. It is, 
nevertheless, safe to conclude that analyses that neglect the change in management 
behavior could lead to significant underestimation of the welfare effect of IRMs or 
other shocks to the supply and/or demand side of the timber market. Accordingly, the 
Lucas critique is not only of theoretical interest, it also has important implications 
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Figure 3. Estimation of the expected present value of total surplus   
t = 1, X1= X0
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